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ABSTRACT
In VANETs, better communication eﬃciency can be achieved
by sacriﬁcing security and vice versa. But VANETs cannot
get started without either of them. In this paper, we propose
a set of mechanisms that can actually reconcile these two
contradictory requirements. The main idea is to use mes-
sage aggregation and group communication. The ﬁrst class
of solutions is based on asymmetric cryptographic primi-
tives, the second class uses symmetric ones, and the third
one mixes the two. We have also evaluated the performance
potential of one technique and arrived at the conclusion that
aggregation in VANETs increases not only eﬃciency but also
security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; C.2.1 [Computer-Communication
Networks]: Network Architecture and Design—Network
communications, Wireless communication.
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Security
Keywords
Vehicular networks, Security, Eﬃciency, Onion signature,
Aggregation, Group communication
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent academic and industrial research on VANETs
has reached the maturity to consider security as a fundamen-
tal building block of any deployable architecture. Several
existing works conﬁrm this development. Yet, all VANET
security solutions are subject to the same founded criti-
cism: overhead. In fact, the most reasonable choice for
a VANET security architecture is a PKI-supported asym-
metric authentication, in addition to other functions, such
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as anonymity. But in this scheme, every message would
have to be signed in order for the receiver to authenticate
it. Although cryptographers have greatly improved the eﬃ-
ciency of asymmetric algorithms, notably ECC (Elliptic Cu-
rve Cryptography), these still are resource-hungry in terms
of computation and communication. This leads us to the
obvious question: can VANET security be more eﬃcient?
This is the question we will try to answer in this paper.
Most VANET application designers attempt to minimize
costs, sometimes even suggesting to scrap security totally.
On one hand, this can be understood if we consider that
the percentage of attackers will probably be very small. On
the other hand, leaving open breaches in huge networks like
VANETs can lead to devastating results even if there is
only one determined and skillful attacker. This means that
both eﬃciency and security are essential, though seemingly
contradictory, conditions for the success of VANETs. The
problem we address in this paper is hence ﬁnding a tradeoﬀ
between the two. This can be achieved by exploiting sev-
eral properties of VANETs that include geographically con-
strained paths, vehicle density and high mobility; we will
further discuss these properties in a later section.
In this paper, we explore the approach of secure message
aggregation, the long-time trademark of resource constrained
sensor networks. Roughly speaking, instead of letting the de
facto ﬂooding approach take care of message dissemination
in a VANET, this is delegated only to selected vehicles who
share a similar view of their environment. We will describe
several algorithms for achieving this and compare them with
each other. We will also introduce the concept of onion
signature, which can be considered the counterpart of onion
routing [4]. Relying on realistic simulations, we have come
to the conclusion that VANET security can be more eﬃcient
when using our aggregation mechanisms.
A useful by-product of secure aggregation is the increase
in information dependability. In fact, grouping several mes-
sages provides the receiver with more evidence concerning a
given event. Our simulation results show this eﬀect.
Another aspect that we address is secure group1 forma-
tion, in itself an open problem in VANET research. Hence
we do not claim to provide a complete solution, but rather
a feasible option that takes security into consideration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews
related work. Section 3 describes the system model and ad-
dresses relevant secure group issues. Section 4 presents the
1In this paper, we use the term group in a networking rather
than distributed systems sense. Hence, it can be used inter-
changeably with the term cluster.
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secure aggregation mechanisms. Section 5 studies one of the
proposed techniques using simulations. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. STATE OF THE ART
The research on VANET security is still developing. Most
existing eﬀorts on the industrial [2], as well as the academic
[8, 9, 11, 17], side focus on describing the problem statement
and proposing the outline of a general solution for VANET
security. To provide vehicle authentication, all these works
commonly agree on the need for a PKI (Public Key Infras-
tructure) and the use of digital signatures. Fewer papers
focus on speciﬁc issues such as the detection and correction
of malicious data [5]. The topic of secure aggregation in
VANETs has not been addressed so far, except for a brief
mention in [9] although it was introduced in a sensor net-
working sense (e.g., vehicles computing the count of encoun-
tered vehicles). Hence, our paper is the ﬁrst to study in
detail this topic in VANETs.
The closest reference in literature to secure aggregation
in networks can be found in sensor networking papers. In
[7], Hu and Evans propose using delayed aggregation (at
the second hop rather than the ﬁrst) and delayed authen-
tication (by delaying key disclosure) to counter the threat
of false data in the network. Their assumptions of a static
network with pre-established shared secrets (between sensor
nodes and the base station), as well as the key idea of delay-
ing authentication, make their work unsuitable for VANETs.
The focus of [10] by Przydatek et al. is also on mitigating
the eﬀects of false aggregation results (the so-called stealthy
attack) by using an aggregate-commit-prove mechanism that
involves interactive proofs between the aggregators and the
home server. Their work also introduces the eﬃciency vs.
accuracy tradeoﬀ. But again, the assumption of a static net-
work and the use of interactive protocols hamper the use of
their techniques in VANETs. In a similar network setting,
Yang et al. [16] introduce secure hop-by-hop aggregation
by using divide-and-conquer and commit-and-attest mecha-
nisms; thus, aggregates can be obtained from multiple sub-
groups rather than the whole network, reducing the eﬀect
of false data injection attacks in some of these subgroups.
Last but not least, Wagner [15] also seeks to achieve approx-
imate integrity of data through statistical methods, such as
outlier elimination. This makes aggregation functions re-
silient to small changes in sensor observations by attackers.
This approach can be complementary to the techniques in-
troduced in the following sections, especially to resolve the
group agreement problem described in Section 3.4.2.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
In the following, we present several aspects related to the
core mechanisms introduced in the next sections. These in-
clude relevant VANET properties, geographic routing, group
formation, and the attacker model. Finally, we use these el-
ements to describe the problem statement.
3.1 Network Model
In this paper, we address only safety related applications.
Each vehicle broadcasts messages to its immediate neigh-
borhood. In addition to vehicles, the network may include
roadside base stations but these are not pervasive. All enti-
ties are equipped with positioning devices, such as a GPS.
Security provision in VANETs is foreseen mainly by the
means of digital signatures. With the existence of a vehicu-
lar PKI, each vehicle will possess a set of public/private key
pairs that it will use to sign broadcasted safety messages.
This ensures that other vehicles will be able to authenti-
cate a received message if it includes a digital signature and
the corresponding certiﬁcate issued by a CA (Certiﬁcation
Authority). For the sake of comparison, we will dub this
mechanism the basic scheme throughout the rest of the pa-
per.
3.2 Efficiency-Propitious Properties of VANETs
VANETs consist of large numbers of vehicles moving at
high speeds over a continent-size network of roads. Most
vehicles are private, which means a lack of a central on-
line coordinating entity. All this may look like a nightmare
for VANET application designers. But when it comes to
the aggregation mechanisms discussed in this paper, these
properties turn out to be very helpful. In fact, the higher the
density of vehicles, the more accurate the aggregate informa-
tion. In addition, VANET safety messages are mainly sent
to all vehicles in a given geographic region rather than to
speciﬁc vehicles. In this case, the predeﬁned road topology
makes it easier to route these messages. And the mobil-
ity of vehicles in both directions can also optimize message
delivery.
3.3 Attacker Model
To avoid reinventing the wheel, we refer the reader to
other works [9, 11] for a full discussion of the attacker model.
In the context of this work, we focus on the assumptions
and properties that are directly related to the aggregation
mechanisms introduced later.
Similarly to sensor networks [7, 10, 15, 16], the major
threat that can target speciﬁcally VANET aggregation mech-
anisms is that of false information dissemination. In fact,
with a PKI and digital signatures in place, message authen-
tication is not a direct issue here. Also, availability problems
(due to jamming) are not aggravated and can actually be al-
leviated by aggregation due to the reduction of channel con-
gestion. But the fact that aggregation reduces the number
of messages (and not the amount of information) can allow
cheaters to insert false data into the network. Therefore, we
have to make the following single assumption:
Any group of vehicles should contain a majority of honest
nodes under normal density conditions.
The deﬁnition of groups will follow shortly in Section
3.4. Normal density conditions refer to typical scenarios
on roads: vehicles driving within at most few tens of me-
ters of each other. This assumption allows us to rely on the
existence of honest group members able to rectify the false
data disseminated by attackers. This is also in line with the
data correctness requirement introduced in Section 3.5.
3.4 Group Aspects
Our algorithms revolve around the core idea of informa-
tion relaying between groups of vehicles rather than individ-
ual vehicles. This, of course, does not concern the physical
transmission of data but the data ﬂow in the network. More
precisely, vehicles are arranged into groups. Within each
group, one or more vehicles, automatically determined by
their positions, transmit the data aggregated in that group
to neighboring groups. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Eﬃcient aggregation by means of overlap-
ping groups. Communication between the two outer
groups is possible because at least the leader of the
center group is in reach of relaying vehicles (in grey)
in both outer groups.
The area of group formation and management is one of the
most important and at the same time complicated topics in
VANET research. Groups have many intuitive applications
in VANET settings, especially platooning-like applications
[12]. From the security standpoint, a recent work [14] has
also suggested using groups to increase the anonymity of
vehicle to infrastructure communications. But there are two
major problems that need to be tackled when addressing
group aspects in VANETs: group formation and intra-group
agreement. In this work we will focus on the ﬁrst and due
to the lack of space we will give only some hints concerning
the second problem.
3.4.1 Group Formation
There can be many ways to form groups in VANET ap-
plications. For example, all public transport buses can be
members of a preset group. This is the easiest and most ef-
ﬁcient way of group formation, but it requires prior knowl-
edge of group members, as well as a common authority over
them. This is not the case when individual drivers on a high-
way decide to join a platoon in order to improve their driv-
ing experience. This necessitates on-the-ﬂy group formation
where a group leader2 is elected and group membership is
managed dynamically. This latter category of groups is the
most useful functionally due to its ﬂexibility, but it is also
the most diﬃcult to form due to a multitude of issues, such
as group leader election, group overlap (e.g., how to decide
which group to join if a vehicle is within the boundaries of
two overlapping groups), and the related security hurdles.
2A group leader can also be called a clusterhead.
In order to escape the rigidity of preset groups and the
complexity of on-the-ﬂy groups while retaining, at least par-
tially, the eﬃciency of the ﬁrst and the ﬂexibility of the lat-
ter, we have sought a hybrid solution. The result is location-
based groups. In fact, for safety applications, which are the
focus of this paper, it is essential to know where, and not
who, the neighbors of a vehicle are. As mentioned earlier,
messages are mostly destined to geographic regions rather
than individual vehicles. For example, if there is sliding ter-
rain behind a curve, all vehicles entering the curve should be
informed. Hence the intuitive idea of sending messages from
groups of vehicles in one location to groups of vehicles in an-
other. This brings us to the group formation primitive we
use in this paper: the map (more precisely, the roads) is dis-
sected into small area cells that actually deﬁne the groups. A
vehicle will automatically know to which group it belongs by
comparing its GPS position to a preloaded dissection of the
area map into cells. The group leader, the vehicle closest to
the center of the cell, is determined dynamically. Cells, and
hence groups, overlap in such a way that any vehicle moving
from one cell to the next remains in transmission range of
both group leaders. This means that the cell size depends on
the transmission range of vehicles. Using the typical DSRC
(Dedicated Short Range Communications) [1] range of 300
m, we have set the cell length in our simulations to 400 m,
which proved to be a suitable value. Further improvements
on cell size calculations could be possible, which we leave
to future work. Figure 1 illustrates this concept, as well as
some details.
A seemingly diﬃcult - but in fact straightforward - pro-
cess associated with location-based group formation is that
of group leader election. As mentioned in the previous para-
graph, the group leader is the vehicle closest to the group’s
cell center. Because cells are predetermined, the center lo-
cation is also known to all vehicles in the cell. In addition,
by leveraging on the periodic safety message broadcasts (at
most each 300 ms [1]) that include a vehicle’s position, each
vehicle is aware of the positions of its neighbors within a tol-
erable margin of error (few meters) due to the imprecision
of GPS. Thus, a group leader election takes place within a
delay of at most 300 ms. If there are several vehicles close
enough to the center such that the error margin does not
allow a clear-cut decision, the vehicle with the lowest ID
among these will be elected as group leader. We should
note here that vehicles do not broadcast their actual IDs
but rather pseudonyms for privacy purposes.
By using location-based groups, we can reap two major
beneﬁts:
• Eﬃciency: A vehicle will automatically know to which
group it belongs. Hence, group formation will not re-
quire any additional communication overhead or delay.
• Routing: As most routing in safety applications is ge-
ographic, determining which groups should relay mes-
sages is straightforward.
To achieve the above advantages, almost the only costs
involved in this type of group formation is the preloading of
map dissections into vehicles. But this can be easily included
on the vehicle navigation maps that will probably be an
integral part of each vehicle when VANET communications
hit the market.
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3.4.2 Group Agreement
In order for information to be generated and propagated
by groups rather than individual vehicles, all vehicles in a
group should share a similar view of their environment. Any
kind of group agreement protocol would be expensive in
terms of communication overhead and delay, without men-
tioning security. Hence we adopt a simpler yet eﬀective ap-
proach: each vehicle locally processes all events, either di-
rectly observed or reported by other vehicles, before making
a decision concerning that event. By using this approach,
we make the following reasonable assumptions:
• Most vehicles in one cell receive messages with similar
information from other cells. This would be the case
if the cell size is comparable to the transmission range
(the respective values that we use in this paper are 400
m and 300 m).
• Under normal traﬃc density (deﬁned in Section 3.3),
any event happening in a cell is observed by several
vehicles. This means that there are alternative sources
of information that can be crosschecked for consistency
veriﬁcation.
• Most honest vehicles observing the same event report
similar observations. Possible errors are due only to
diﬀerences in on-board sensor readings.
In addition, we leverage on the assumption that attackers
are a minority among network members, which means that
there is a majority of correct observers.
Under the above conditions, the majority of vehicles in a
cell share a similar view of the environment within tolerable
margins of error. We leave the details of this algorithm for
future work - due to the lack of space. A good existing
example of such an approach can be found in [5].
3.4.3 Secure VANET Group Protocol
We end the discussion on group aspects by introducing
a simple protocol for symmetric group key establishment
in VANETs: SVGP (Secure VANET Group Protocol). It is
inspired notably from the Group Key Management Protocol
(GKMP) [6] but with geographically deﬁned groups. This
protocol will be later used in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
As explained before, roads are divided into cells that de-
ﬁne groups, with the group leader being the vehicle closest
to the cell center. Leveraging on periodic broadcasts of cer-
tiﬁed public keys, the group leader (L in this example) dis-
tributes the group keyK to members A, B, and C encrypted
with their respective public keys as follows:
L→ ∗ : {K}PuKA , {K}PuKB , {K}PuKC ,
SigPrKL [{K}PuKA |{K}PuKB |{K}PuKC ]
Subsequent message broadcasts will include only a HMAC
in addition to the message itself:
L→ ∗ : m,HMACK(m)
When a new vehicleD enters the cell, it receives the group
key from the current group leader:
L→ D : {K}PuKD , SigPrKL [{K}PuKD ]
When a vehicle leaves the cell, nothing needs to be done.
In fact, the creation of secure groups will only contribute
to reducing the security overhead and not deﬁning diﬀer-
ent security levels among VANET members. Similarly to
digital signatures, the use of secure groups protects the net-
work from outsiders (entities that do not possess certiﬁed
public/private key pairs). Hence, while renewing or trans-
ferring existing keys during member joins is still necessary,
member leaves should not necessarily entail an update of the
group key.
Special attention needs to be paid to exchanges on cell
boundaries when a vehicle switches from one group to an-
other. In order to make this operation smooth, cell dimen-
sions should be smaller than the diameter of the transmis-
sion range disk. For example, if the transmission range is
300 m (the disk diameter is 600 m), we can choose a cell
size of 400 m. Hence, at the cell boundaries, a vehicle will
receive messages from the leaders of both its previous and
new groups.
There are several other functional details of this protocol
that need to be worked out. But our purpose is to make it as
simple as possible in order to demonstrate its usage in secure
message aggregation. Hence, we describe this protocol only
as an example; other mechanisms are also possible. It is
also important to note that shared group keys are limited in
space and time due to the small ﬁxed cells and high vehicle
mobility. This makes the vulnerability windows, opened by
the compromise of these keys, small.
3.5 Efficient Security by Aggregation
The basic scheme described in Section 3.1 actually sum-
marizes the way VANET messaging security is envisioned
thus far. Its main advantage is simplicity and the inherent
robustness, which is very important for critical safety appli-
cations. But the overhead generated by this simple scheme
leaves ample space for improvement. In fact, there is cur-
rently a gap between eﬃciency and security in VANETs,
with one of the two usually achieved at the expense of the
other. In this work, we make an attempt at bridging this
gap by exploiting several properties of VANETs and propos-
ing fundamentally diﬀerent solutions. Moreover, we will try
to keep a level of security at least equivalent to the one pro-
vided by the basic scheme. The main focus of this paper
will be message aggregation and group communication as
sketched in Figure 1. As Section 5 will show, our objectives
are achievable.
Before attacking the solution space, it is important to keep
in mind the requirements of any viable solution. A full list
of such properties can be found in several papers [9, 11]. In
the following, we list the main properties we seek to achieve
in our solutions, the others being orthogonal to the proposed
mechanisms.
• Channel Eﬃciency: The security overhead due to
signing safety messages is high. In fact, the security
material can even sometimes exceed the rest of the
message payload [11]. This in turn results in channel
congestion that hinders the transmission of safety mes-
sages. Despite this drawback, security cannot be to-
tally overlooked because a non-secure network is more
dangerous than an overloaded network, especially when
it comes to life-critical applications. Hence, a primary
objective of our work is to increase channel eﬃciency
by reducing the security overhead.
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• Low Delay: Another important VANET parameter
to be strictly respected is low delay. Because an acci-
dent can be avoided within fractions of a second, re-
ducing the safety message delivery delay is another
priority.
• Data Correctness: Data received by vehicles should
be checked for correctness. Otherwise, cheaters will
be able to disseminate false information in the net-
work, thus endangering its safety. A typical and simple
mechanism for ensuring data correctness is by cross-
checking several sources of information. It is interest-
ing to observe that aggregation mechanisms inherently
provide this property, as we will explain later.
• Non-repudiation: Last but not least is the non-
repudiation property, or the capability to trace back
attackers even after the attacks take place. This cre-
ates a prevention mechanism against potential cheaters
because they can be pursued by justice.
4. SECURE AGGREGATION MECHANISMS
In this section we present three major classes of aggre-
gation techniques, each one representing a diﬀerent way to
achieve better eﬃciency. The main feature of these tech-
niques is that only selected vehicles (the relaying vehicles in
Figure 1) take care of message aggregation and dissemina-
tion. Eﬃciency is achieved because vehicles overhearing the
source of the aggregated message will restrain from broad-
casting messages with similar information.
4.1 Combined Signatures
In the basic scheme, each vehicle broadcasts a signed safety
message. This creates considerable security overhead, es-
pecially in terms of message size and signature generation
delay. There may be an additional delay resulting from
data veriﬁcation algorithms running on the receiving vehi-
cles. One of the ways to cope with false data in the network
is to crosscheck data concerning an event by comparing mes-
sages received from several sources. The downside of data
crosschecking is that a vehicle needs to wait for several mes-
sages with information on the same event, which creates a
certain delay.
Bearing in mind the above drawbacks of independent safety
messages, we have sought to combine the signatures gener-
ated by a group of vehicles reporting the same event. Thus,
all the overhead will be grouped in one message instead of
being spread over several, resulting in a more eﬃcient chan-
nel usage. In addition, once a vehicle receives such a com-
bined message, it can skip the data veriﬁcation process be-
cause the combined signatures imply that all the involved
signers agree on the content of the message. There are sev-
eral types of signature combinations, each with its own ben-
eﬁts and drawbacks, especially in terms of overhead. The
formats of the three types of combined signatures are shown
in Figure 2. It should be noted that this aggregation tech-
nique makes use of only asymmetric cryptography, hence the
need for including the public key certiﬁcates of all signers in
the corresponding message.
4.1.1 Concatenated Signatures
In this case, a vehicle that receives a message with cor-
rect information (from the receiver’s perspective) appends
m S1(m) Sn(m)...
m Sn(...(S1(m)))
C1 ... Cn
C1 ... Cn
m C1 ... CnSn(...(Sj(m)))
Concatenated signature
Onion signature
Hybrid signature
Sn-1
Si-1 Si(...(S1(m))) Sn-1
Figure 2: Three diﬀerent types of combined signa-
tures. n is the total number of signers.
its signature to the existing signatures and rebroadcasts the
new message. As signatures are appended to the message
independently of each other, they will also be veriﬁed inde-
pendently. Hence, there is no need for signers to verify the
other signatures. Thus, concatenating signatures generates
the same security overhead in terms of signature size and
generation as the basic scheme. But its network overhead
is considerably smaller as the results in Section 5 show. It
also overcomes the basic scheme in terms of data veriﬁcation
delay because a destination vehicle receives data explicitly
approved by several signers. This form of source aggrega-
tion (supporting data is gathered at the source) results in
smaller data veriﬁcation delay than destination aggregation
(the receiver collects messages from diﬀerent sources and
then crosschecks them), as we will show in Section 5.4. An-
other advantage of signature concatenation is that an invalid
signature does not aﬀect the whole message, in contrast to
the next scheme.
4.1.2 Onion Signatures
A key challenge in this paper was to reduce the signature
size. Although this is not possible for a single message under
a given cryptosystem, we have achieved the reduction of the
total overhead associated with given information (usually
expressed in several messages with similar content). Ex-
ploiting the fact that signature sizes are constant because
a message is hashed before being signed, we explored the
possibility of oversigning a message. Instead of simply ap-
pending its signature, a vehicle signs the signature of the
previous transmitter. Before retransmitting the new mes-
sage, it should also include the last signature, i.e., the one it
received, so that the vehicle at the next hop can verify the
new signature. With this approach, no matter how many
times a message is oversigned, the ultimate result will al-
ways be the safety message with two signatures (the new
and the previous ones). Since this technique is similar to
the message reencryption process in onion routing [4], we
coined it onion signature.
Obviously, the drastic improvement in signature size comes
at a cost. As each vehicle contributes to the combined sig-
nature by adding an onion layer signature (i.e., oversign-
ing), an invalid signature at any layer invalidates the ﬁnal
combined signature. To reduce the processing costs of sig-
nature veriﬁcation at the receiver, each signer has to verify
the last signature before oversigning. If the signature is in-
valid, it has to discard the existing signature and restart the
onion signature generation. Obviously, verifying signatures
at each hop increases the overall computation overhead, in
addition to delaying the delivery of the combined signature
to the destination. Moreover, a false message with a valid
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signature cannot be detected directly. But this attack can
be thwarted by the possibility of punishment as the non-
repudiation property of digital signatures allows the CA to
determine the attacker.
4.1.3 Hybrid Signatures
Although concatenated signatures, in terms of computa-
tion overhead, are more eﬃcient than onion signatures, the
opposite is true with respect to communication overhead.
This gives several choices in terms of the hardware and soft-
ware platforms to use. To accommodate an even wider spec-
trum of equipment conﬁgurations, a hybrid solution that
combines features of both approaches is possible. A hybrid
signature would consist of several concatenated onion signa-
tures, each of a given depth. The signature depth represents
the number of layers it includes. The number and depth of
onion signatures can be varied according to the targeted
communication and computation overheads.
4.2 Overlapping Groups
Despite the advantages achieved by the schemes in the
previous section, they are still in the realm of asymmetric
cryptography, which remains expensive. To make a quanti-
tative leap, we designed a mechanism based on symmetric
cryptography. The core idea is to use overlapping groups,
each group having its own symmetric key. Vehicles in the
intersection of two groups know the keys of both groups and
hence are able to assure the bridge for data ﬂow between
the two groups. In order to further clarify this mechanism,
we need several assumptions and tools, some of which have
been introduced in Section 3:
• The position of a vehicle can be securely determined
or veriﬁed. This implies the need for a secure position
veriﬁcation primitive.
• Groups are established with each group having its own
symmetric key. We have presented in Section 3.4 the
diﬀerent aspects related to this issue, namely group
formation, agreement, and key establishment.
• There is a majority of honest vehicles, upon which data
destination vehicles can rely to receive correct informa-
tion. Because all communication between groups uses
symmetric mechanisms, the non-repudiation property
is lost. Although cheating attackers cannot be discour-
aged by the possibility of later punishment, their eﬀect
will still be countered by the honest majority.
Figure 1 illustrates how information ﬂows between over-
lapping groups. Because groups are geographically prede-
ﬁned, vehicles in the intersection of two groups are aware
of their status as relaying nodes. The SVGP protocol intro-
duced in Section 3.4.3 provides them with the keys of both
groups.
Obviously, the main advantage of data ﬂow between over-
lapping groups is the reduced communication and compu-
tation overhead due to symmetric cryptography. The draw-
backs are the need for secure position veriﬁcation, the over-
head of group aspects, and the loss of the non-repudiation
property. Secure position veriﬁcation will be needed any-
way in VANETs and the lack of non-repudiation can be
countered by the presence of an honest majority, thus over-
lapping groups can still be a viable solution to build secure
and eﬃcient VANETs.
4.3 Dynamic Group Key Creation
A spontaneous question that stems from the above two
mechanisms is: Can we achieve the low overhead of symmet-
ric cryptography without losing the non-repudiation prop-
erty of digital signatures? The answer is yes and the means
is dynamic group key creation. Before delving into the de-
tails of this mechanism, we have to make one assumption:
the existence of sporadic infrastructure coverage. Although
still on the to-do list, this infrastructure coverage will prob-
ably soon become reality.
In contrast to overlapping groups where memberships are
geographically determined, in this section we consider dy-
namic groups created by vehicles sharing the same driving
pattern over an extended period of time. A good example of
such groups is a platoon of vehicles formed on the highway.
We leave the exact mechanism of group formation out of
scope of this work because it highly depends on the speciﬁc
VANET application and is not directly related to our main
subject.
The key idea is that once the leader and members of the
group are identiﬁed, the leader creates a key request mes-
sage with the format and content as illustrated in Figure 3.
And once in the range of a roadside base station, the leader
transmits the message to the CA through the base station
(Figure 4). The CA will use the information it receives to
generate an asymmetric group key pair and broadcast it to
all the group members. The key pair will be encrypted with
the symmetric group key included in the key request mes-
sage (this key can be generated using SVGP described in
Section 3.4.3). In addition, the CA assigns to each group
member a unique ID for non-repudiation purposes.
Once the asymmetric group key is established, any group
member can send a message signed on behalf of the group.
This implies that a group agreement process (Section 3.4.2)
has taken place before the message is sent. As with the
digital signatures in the basic scheme, the digital signature
of the group is accompanied by its certiﬁcate issued by the
CA in order to allow the receivers to verify the signature.
The message also includes the unique ID assigned by the
CA to the group member that sent the message. Normally,
this group member is the vehicle closest to the destination.
Dynamic group
Key request
Figure 4: Dynamic group key creation.
As in the previous mechanism, the case of a cheating group
member can be mitigated by making more than one vehicle
send the message and relying on the presence of an honest
majority. In contrast to the overlapping groups, dynamic
key creation conserves the non-repudiation property. The
72
key request S1(m) Sn(m)... C1 ... CnP1 ... Pn
m
{K}PuK(BS)
Figure 3: The format and content of a dynamic key request message. Pi, Si and Ci represent the position,
signature and certiﬁcate of vehicle i, respectively. {K}PuK(BS) is the symmetric group key encrypted with
the public key of the base station BS that receives the request.
reason is that each group member is assigned a unique ID
by the CA. Hence, if the message turns out be false, the CA
will be able to trace back the identity of the cheater (this
also encompasses malfunctioning vehicles since they need to
be recalled for repair). There are several ways proposed in
the literature for generating unique identiﬁers bound to the
cryptographic material of an entity [3].
5. SIMULATION RESULTS
We simulated one of the aggregation mechanisms in a re-
alistic VANET environment to see its eﬀects on network and
security performance. This section presents the details and
results of these simulations.
5.1 Simulation Setup
We chose ns-2 as our network simulator. To faithfully
represent a VANET scenario, we used the scenario genera-
tor developed in [13]. We used the road network represented
in Figure 5 for its suitability for illustrating the geographic
routing primitive. Following the procedure introduced in
Section 3.4.1, we geographically divided the map into cells
of 400 m each. The presented results were obtained by av-
eraging 100 simulations. We assumed the use of an Elliptic
Curve Cryptosystem with a key size of 256 bits (28 bytes),
a signature size of 56 bytes and a certiﬁcate size of approx-
imately 84 bytes (a public key with a CA signature over
it).
Figure 5: Simulation scenario.
In our simulations, we examine the eﬀects of vehicle den-
sity and speed on the bandwidth consumption and delay
resulting from using secure aggregation mechanisms. For
the purpose of these simulations, we used one of the com-
bined signature mechanisms, namely concatenated signa-
tures (Section 4.1.1), and compared it to the basic scheme
(Section 3.1). The reason for evaluating concatenated signa-
tures is that they are the most bandwidth-hungry and hence
represent an upper bound on the channel usage overhead.
Another reason is that there are no agreed upon speciﬁca-
tions for vehicle onboard security hardware; therefore, it is
hard to estimate the processing delays at each vehicle for
the onion and hybrid signature mechanisms.
Another important factor to consider in the results is the
correctness level of messages - the number of supporting sig-
natures needed to consider the content of a message as valid.
By setting this level to 1, we run the risk of a single cheater
disseminating false information in the network. After trying
several values, we found that 4 is a suﬃcient number of mes-
sages for a good correctness level. Hence, in the following
simulations, a vehicle waits for 4 messages containing the
same information before considering this information valid
and making subsequent decisions.
Having introduced the correctness level, we have to dis-
tinguish between aggregation at the source or at the desti-
nation. In the ﬁrst case, the source waits to receive enough
messages (4 as mentioned above) for reaching the correct-
ness level and then sends the aggregated message (including
all signatures) to the destination. A vehicle that receives the
aggregated message can begin directly processing it without
further waiting for any other supporting messages. In the
latter case, a vehicle in the destination area needs to wait
for 4 messages before considering the included information.
Section 5.4 shows that aggregation at the source improves
the performance of safety messaging.
5.2 Effects of Vehicle Density
To study the eﬀects of vehicle density on the use of ag-
gregation techniques, we varied the total number of vehi-
cles in the grid-like scenario in Figure 5 and kept the ve-
hicle distribution uniform and speed constant at 50 km/h.
Hence, in the following graphs, vehicle density is expressed
in vehicles/km of road. This unit is more representative
than vehicles/km2, especially in highway scenarios. Figures
6(a) and 6(b) illustrate the variation of channel overhead (in
terms of the number of broadcasted messages) and message
delivery delay. In both cases, we assume the same message
correctness level of 4.
In Figure 6(a) we can see that using aggregation drasti-
cally reduces the number of broadcasted messages compared
to the basic scheme. This is a normal result because the ag-
gregated message suppresses any other messages sent from
its area.
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Figure 6: Eﬀects of vehicle density on the performance of message aggregation.
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Figure 7: Eﬀects of vehicle speed on the performance of message aggregation.
For message delivery delay, it is interesting to observe in
Figure 6(b) that aggregation also results in a smaller delay
than the basic scheme. The explanation of this eﬀect is
twofold:
1. Although vehicles in the destination area receive the
ﬁrst message earlier under the basic scheme, they still
have to accumulate the necessary number of messages
to reach the proper correctness level. Hence, the ag-
gregated message is received before the last required
message in the basic scheme; the reason is explained
in the next point.
2. Because the number of broadcasted messages is con-
siderably smaller in the aggregation scenario, there is
much less congestion on the wireless channel. This in
turn favors faster delivery of messages.
In addition to the basic and aggregation schemes, Figure
6(b) illustrates the delay achieved when the correctness level
is set to 1, i.e., when the ﬁrst received message is considered
valid. We can see that boosting the correctness level (by
4 times) results in a tolerable additional delay (around 10
ms). This suggests that data veriﬁcation can be done at
aﬀordable costs.
5.3 Effects of Vehicle Speed
We have also explored the eﬀects of vehicle speed (Figures
7(a) and 7(b)) with a density of 2.5 vehicles/km of road.
The reason for choosing this value is that it represents the
worst case scenario according to the results of the previous
section; the performance gap between the aggregation and
basic schemes increases at higher densities in favor of the
ﬁrst.
According to Figure 7(a), channel overhead decreases with
increasing speed. Although this seems to be surprising, it
can be explained by the fact that at higher speeds a smaller
fraction of messages is delivered, resulting in smaller eﬀec-
tive channel usage (lost messages are not represented on the
graphs).
As for the delay, Figure 7(b) shows high variability with
speed. These ﬂuctuations can be explained as above by the
varying number of successfully received messages. In fact,
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Figure 8: Eﬃciency vs. Security
vehicle mobility can speed up message delivery but can also
result in higher message losses. We can see that at high
speeds, the correctness level could not be achieved in both
the basic and the aggregation schemes.
These results suggest that further investigations should be
done on the eﬀects of mobility in VANETs. But in the con-
text of our study, both graphs show, as with vehicle density,
that aggregation performs better than the basic scheme in
terms of channel overhead and message delivery delay.
5.4 Effects of Correctness Level
Last but not least, we examined how changing the cor-
rectness level aﬀects the delay of message delivery. As infor-
mation correctness aﬀects the security of the network, the
resulting graph represents, in a sense, the Eﬃciency vs. Se-
curity tradeoﬀ. And not surprisingly, Figure 8 shows that
the higher the correctness level, the higher the delivery delay.
Moreover, aggregation performs far better than the basic
scheme when the correctness level increases. It is also inter-
esting to observe that the increase in the delay is rather slow
when using aggregation. This leads to the conclusion that
better data assurance can be eﬃciently achieved through
aggregation.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the tradeoﬀ between ef-
ﬁciency and security in VANETs. We have proposed sev-
eral mechanisms, including combined signatures, overlap-
ping groups, and dynamic group key creation. We have
evaluated the performance of one type of combined signa-
tures, namely concatenated signatures. The results conﬁrm
that secure aggregation is a promising approach for increas-
ing the channel eﬃciency and decreasing message delivery
delay in VANETs. Moreover, we have come to the interest-
ing conclusion that aggregation contributes to better data
correctness and, in some sense, a higher level of security.
Our plans for future work include exploring other aggre-
gation techniques, as well as diﬀerent types of eﬃcient mech-
anisms. We also intend to study the eﬀect of mobility on
VANET performance because this seems to be an intriguing
topic.
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